Dr Charles Wereko-Brobby
WHAT I MET AND WHAT I DID
MY TENURE AS CHIEF
EXECUTIVE
OF
Dr.
Charles Wereko-Brobby
1. INTRODUCTION:
1. I
was appointed Chief Executive of the Volta River Authority (VRA) on
2. Within
a space of four months, the public interest in VRA’s
affairs began to focus on the substance of my work with the Authority,
especially the relevance and impact of substantial changes that were being
introduced into the Authority’s operations.
In a sense, the reaction of staff to the changes being made by what they
perceived to be an outsider Chief Executive could be understood, even if the
substance of the changes themselves was in the right direction. This reaction of
the staff to the fundamental changes being made in the Authority was
crystallised in the form of a growing spate of unprecedented leakage of
official VRA documentation to the public, especially the media and the National
Security Agencies.
3. Subsequently,
the leadership of the staff groups made several allegations of impropriety and
fraudulent conduct and mismanagement against me and acting through a series of
mass meetings resolved that Government should terminate my appointment as Chief
Executive, summarised in the now infamous statement of “WHOEVER BROUGHT WEREKO-BROBBY TO VRA MUST COME AND TAKE HIM AWAY”.
4. In
response to the increasing levels of complaint and public interest in the
affairs of the VRA, Government directed the Auditor – General to carry out a
comprehensive investigation into allegations of corruption and impropriety made
by the leaders of the staff groups.
Whilst the Auditor – General’s investigation was going on, and in the
midst of negotiations on new conditions of service for the period 2003 – 2004, some
staff of the VRA led by the Akosombo Branch resolved
to withdraw their labour until such a time that I was removed from office.
5. The
Minister of Energy intervened in the matter and established a Committee of
Enquiry to go into specific allegations made by the staff groups. Whilst this was going on, staff continued to
agitate for my removal and the seriousness of this intent was manifested by a
specific threat to shut down the entire power system if their demand was not
met immediately.
6. On
7. On
8. Whilst
the Minister’s recommendation to the President was being reviewed by
Government, a fresh campaign of vilification was initiated by the Ghanaian
Chronicle, using information and documentation which had been provided by the
Authority to the Ministerial Committee.
The climax of the new phase of campaign against me came in a form of a
banner headline carried by the Evening News of
9. So
what is it that I have done, that has in the space of just 22 months under my
stewardship, turned the VRA from a perception of an institution of exemplary
performance and professional competence into the current state of near anarchy
and the object of intense public interest?
10. This
is the story of my tenure at VRA. It
attempts to address the following important questions.
Ø
What did I find
at the VRA when I arrived there?
Ø
What actions did
I take to address the major problems that I encountered?
Ø
What were the
benefits and of course, the cost of the measures that I took to address the
problems?
Ø
What lessons do
I believe have been learnt by myself and the staff of VRA?
Ø
What are my
hopes and expectations for my future and VRA?
2. ISSUES
AND CHALLENGES
Preamble:
11. I
arrived at VRA at the time when the Authority was in the throes of a very deep
and challenging period of transition in all of its operations. An Institution whose business has been built
on production of power from the Akosombo hydro dam
now had to face the reality of a significant and growing injection of thermal
power into its operations.
12. The
onset of thermal generation which costs about 3 to 4 times the cost to produce the
traditional hydro had began to compound and impact significantly on finances of
the Authority. Uncharacteristically for
VRA, the Authority had began to incur significant losses in its operations from
1997 – 2000. These losses were
attributed mainly to the failure of the Authority coupled with the reluctance
of Government, to ensure that the Authority was able to recover the full cost
of its operations from increment in its tariffs. Indeed with the exception of major tariff
increases in May 2001, whose success I assisted with in my earlier role as
Energy Adviser to the President, the Authority had received no tariff increases
since 1998 and the value of the tariff was diminishing rapidly with the
deteriorating depreciation in the exchange rate and increasing inflation in the
period 1997 – 2000.
13. Another
factor in the transition was the need to transform the work culture in the
organisation from its traditional focus on hydro to meet the new challenges of
increasing thermal generation. Under the
old order of things, the most significant and crucial dates in the Authority’s
annual calendar, was the first day of November each year. On this day, the level of the
14. Under
the all hydro regime, once the most important date had passed and it was deemed
that there was enough water to produce electricity, the sense of urgency,
timeliness and financial discipline were no more crucial. The certainty of enough water to generate
power at a low cost coupled with the fact that the Authority’s revenues almost
always exceeded its expenditures combined to create a culture and an environment
where, proficiency and productivity were not crucial in ensuring the success of
the Authority’s operations.
15. Since
1998 and the introduction of thermal power into VRA’s
operations, the singular requirement for regular procurement of crude oil has
required the Authority to significantly alter its working practices and
relationships with its clients, suppliers and financial lenders. The Authority’s finances have moved from a
surplus position in which it was not required to borrow money to finance its
day to day operations because its revenues exceeded its cost, to a situation
where it has been required for the past five years to borrow significantly from
the financial market to meet its operational cash requirements, especially for
the procurement of crude oil.
16. Also
the need to operate the more technologically challenging thermal power plants,
especially with the greater and more frequent need for maintenance, and the
growing load on the transmission system, have all combined to require the
Authority’s staff to undertake a fundamental change in culture of the
organisation, their work practices and general performance of all staff.
17. The
state of affairs at the time that I arrived at the Authority was an institution
beset with many serious technical problems.
Unable to secure the requisite financial resources to tackle these
problems, a very demoralised and frustrated work force saw its only salvation
in Government doling out money to enable it to keep going.
18. That
VRA continued to operate has more to do with its role as a strategic national
developmental asset than as a result of its ability to address successfully the
fundamental changes that were facing it in its transition from a hydro power
company to a normal international power producer.
19. In
the background to all of this, has been the ongoing effort by the Government, in
partnership with international development agencies, to push for a fundamental
reform of Ghana’s power sector, to make it more responsive to the needs of its
customers, and to improve productivity and performance to the best practice
found elsewhere in the world.
20. I
have organised this account of my stewardship under five main areas which cover
the major issues and the challenges of my stewardship of the Authority as:
2.1 TECHNICAL
21. The
business of VRA is to ensure the reliable and un-interrupted supply of power to
facilitate our country’s development.
The state of the power system when I started work at VRA was
characterised by the following:
i.
Very low level
of the
ii. Power
supply to VRA’s major customers was characterised by
high levels of instability, massive fluctuations and incessant power cuts. The consequence was that most consumers
suffered serious damage to plant and equipment.
iii. Critical
generation capacity at Takoradi, which should have
provided power in the wake of the low lake level, was not in operation.
iv.
There was a
major constraint in the supply of power from the western corridor; as a result
of long standing delays in the construction of the 161kV Prestea
– Obuasi line.
v. Power imports from La Cote
2.2 FINANCIAL:
22. At
the time that I took office, the VRA was technically a bankrupt organisation. The cumulative losses from the years 1997 to
2000 amounted to ¢ 1,430.4 billion and a projected loss for the year 2001 was
estimated at ¢ 1,644 billion.
23. The
major causes of the Authority’s financial problems were:
i.
Many years of
low and inadequate tariffs which had exacerbated the Authority’s already worse financial
base as the proportion of thermal power increased.
ii.
Difficulties to
pay for power products from the major thermal suppliers namely CIE of La Cote
iii.
Difficulties to
finance loans which the Authority has acquired for major capital developments
and to finance operational activities.
iv.
Difficulties to
obtain resources to finance the procurement of crude oil to meet the growing
thermal component of the power supply.
v.
Mounting debts
owed by our major domestic customer, ECG, and the Electricity Companies of
2.3 LOGISTICS:
24. In
spite of the fact that VRA operations cover the length and breadth of the
country with 41 substations dotted around the country, the level of logistical
support that I found when I arrived at the Authority was woefully inadequate,
extremely old and very unreliable. The
following were the key areas of logistical deficiencies:
i.
A very old
vehicular fleet which had not been renewed for about a decade. Essential maintenance work, especially on the
transmission lines, had been reduced to emergency resolution instead of regular
preventive work.
ii.
Communication
systems, essential for the widely dispersed staff of the Authority to keep in
touch with each other, especially for monitoring the performance of the more
than 4000 km of transmission lines, were largely obsolete.
iii.
Computers and
other information and communication technical equipment were very inadequate.
iv.
The critical
computer applications for carrying out the Authority’s business, especially,
financial operations, human resources management, management
of the transport sector, the control of stock and materials and the billing of VRA’s customers in the Northern Electricity Department’s
area of operation were all beset with serious problems of unreliable
performance and obsolescence.
2.4 STAFF WELFARE:
25. I
encountered a situation where staff morale was extremely low because of the
long standing failure to resolve some of the most critical matters of staff
welfare.
26. Amongst
the principal issues were the following:
i.
That promotions
and increment for many of the staff had been left untackled
since 1996.
ii.
That vacation
leave which had been deferred for many staff for many years, were still
outstanding in terms of staff not being allowed to take the leave or to be
compensated for the time.
iii.
A substantial
number of staff had been engaged on contract and casual basis for many years,
some for as long as 15 – 20 years, and naturally they were unhappy about this
development.
iv.
Important
infrastructural developments and renovations of the school facilities had been
kept on the drawing board for several years.
v.
Staff
who were not provided with
housing by the Authority faced increasing difficulties in securing funds to
meet rent commitments.
vi.
There appeared
not to be a transparent and consistent Staff Development and Training Policy
2.5 PRODUCTIVITY AND CONTROL:
27. Whilst
staff morale was low and could therefore be expected to have a negative impact
on productivity and control of the Authority’s resources, I found a situation
in the Authority which showed a fundamental weakness in productivity and
growing laxity in the application and dedication of many of the staff to their
work.
28. Amongst
the principal areas of deficiency were:
i.
Abuse of the use
of Staff Provident Fund which has been established for the expressed purpose of
assisting staff to prepare for their retirement.
ii.
Inordinately
high overtime claims.
iii.
Misuse of
Authority’s vehicles.
iv.
Abuse of procedures
on the use of Authority’s funds, especially claims for allowances and other
financial controls.
v.
Failure to
retire imprest accounts for both domestic and foreign
operations.
vi.
Failure to
implement the recommendation of audits carried out into various operations of
the Authority
vii.
A laxity in the
enforcement of disciplinary procedures in the Authority.
viii.
The abuse of the
provisions of the leave of absence and the general conditions for the support
of staff development and training especially, the breach of bonds by staff
trained at the Authority’s expense.
ix.
The absence of
any form of procedures for measuring productivity of staff at various levels
and accounting for the work that they do for the Authority.
2.6 MANAGEMENT STYLE:
29. When
I arrived at VRA, the law was that, every decision was reposed in the person of
the Chief Executive. This state of
affairs produced a situation of a very remote ‘venerable’ chief executive who
oversaw the activities of the Authority largely from the hallowed corridors of
the 10th floor of the Authority’s head office.
30. Some
of the problems associated with the style of management were:
i.
The specific
roles and responsibilities of the Senior Management, i.e. Deputy Chief
Executives and Directors were not very clearly laid out and therefore, they
could not be properly held to account.
ii.
The level of
contact between the Chief Executive and most of the staff was either totally
absent or very infrequent. Indeed most
of VRA staff outside of the head office in
iii.
Most staff felt
the absence of opportunities or any avenues to present their individual
problems for consideration by the Chief Executive. For an organisation where the Chief Executive
was the alpha and omega, it was understandable that most staff could feel that
nobody else other than the Chief Executive could deal with their own problems.
31. The
fore-going were the major issues and challenges that I took on when I assumed
office as Chief Executive of VRA. The
following narrative presents a succinct account of how I tackled these issues,
the impact that came from them and the reaction that led to the current state
of affairs.
2.1.1 TECHNICAL
SOLUTIONS:
32. Notwithstanding
the low level of the
33. In the
above respect, the following major programmes were put into effect:
i. To
repair and restore the generating capacity at the Takoradi
Power Company to its full operation in the shortest possible time. This would enable us to generate thermal
power cheaper than import from la
ii. Immediate
and urgent action was taken to improve the reliability of the power supply by
the acquisition and installation of essential maintenance equipment and
operational changes to the management of the transmission system. These changes led to the restoration of the
reliability of the system, which translated into a substantial improvement in
the quality of power supplied to all consumers.
The success of this measure is demonstrated by the fact that most
Ghanaians now have nearly forgotten about the severe problems that they had
with their basic domestic equipment.
iii. With
the low lake level, power generation from the Akosombo
dam was severely curtailed.
Unfortunately, this could not be compensated for fully by the thermal
power from Takoradi and imports from La Cote
iv. Uncertain
as to when the World Bank would give the go ahead for the project to be completed,
the Authority decided to use its own resources to fund the construction of the
line at a cost of approximately US$ 8 million.
Construction began on
v. Consistent
with the policy to maintain the country’s power supply, rather than revert to
the traditional practice of systematic and sustained load shedding, the
Authority decided to fill the gap between the demand by its customers and the
available generating capacity by leasing an Emergency Power Plant (EPP). The added objective of leasing the plant was
to also assist in the management of the
vi. Unfortunately,
whilst the technical merits for the acquisition of the EPP (which later on came
to be known as the Strategic Reserve Plant (SRP)), are sound and indeed
essential for the success of the continuous power supply, the implementation of
the project has been beset by a number of serious technical, operational and
contractual problems. The result is that
the immediate objectives of the Plant have not been successfully met, and a
number of serious financial and technical issues remain to be resolved. However, the short to medium term usefulness
of the Plant to meeting
vii. In
an effort to ensure that the power system is able to meet the challenges of
supplying all of the country’s power requirements for the next two decades, a
number of important strategic projects are being put into place. Funds have already been secured from the
Kuwait Fund to enable the construction of a 330kV transmission line from Aboadze to Tema.
viii. The
project is necessary to alleviate the already choked transmission lines from
the Western part of the country, which supplies all towns up to and including Winneba. When this
project is completed within the next two years, it will be possible to evacuate
a substantial proportion of the power produced at the Takoradi
Plant and give additional flexibility in the effective management of the power
system in the changing circumstances where thermal generation will continue to
contribute a greater share of the country’s power system.
xi. Significant
progress has been made in the development of the West African Gas Pipeline
(WAGP). The Authority inspite of its difficult financial situation has been able
to successfully meet all of its obligations of US$ 8.3 million as the
foundation customer for the gas. In
addition to this, the Authority has successfully taken over the role of the
custodian of
x. These
developments have led to the establishment of a concrete time table and a firm
decision to go ahead with the project and to deliver gas to the Takoradi Thermal Power Plant (TTPP) by June 2005. The availability of gas at Takoradi and other Thermal Plants in
xi. Significant
progress has also been made to secure financing for other important
infrastructural projects aimed at increasing the power generation and
transmission capacities to meet the demand for the next twenty years. See
Appendix II.
2.2.2
FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS:
34. The
following has been the major steps taken to resuscitate the Authority’s
financial problems and return it to a state of financial solvency.
i. In
November 2001, the Authority prepared and presented a Financial Rescue Plan for
the consideration of the President His Excellency, J. A. Kufuor
and the Government. The proposals
contained the plan titled ‘Restoring the
Financial Health of the
ii. The
Authority has made successful representations to the Public Utilities
Regulatory Commission (PURC) with the result that there have been two major
increases in tariffs in August 2002 and March 2003.
iii. Substantial
progress has been made to restore the Authority’s financial credibility with
its two major power suppliers, CIE and CMS/TICO. The arrears of $ 55.6 million and $ 13.2
million which were owed to CIE and TICO at the time that I assumed office were
cleared in total by July and December 2002 respectively. Unfortunately, the problems with our own
generating capacity at Akosombo and Takoradi have resulted in the accumulation of more debts to
our power suppliers. Arrangements have
been made with Barclays Bank to pay off US$ 10 million of the TICO debt
currently about US$ 19 million.
Discussions are also on-going for a syndicate of Banks to pay off a
substantial portion of the CIE debt currently amounting to US$ 32 million.
iv. The
increasing reliance on thermal generation has had a disturbing negative impact
on the Authority’s finances. The main
cost element is the procurement of crude oil to run the Aboadze
Plant. When I assumed office in VRA, there
was a lack of consistency in the procurement of crude oil. The average premium paid by the Authority to
the supplier was US$3.50 per barrel bought.
A decision was taken to put the supply of crude oil on tender as well as
to separate the procurement of crude oil from the shipment of the product. As a result of this, the premium paid per
each barrel of crude oil cover for both amounts to US$1.9 per barrel, this
translates into a saving of US$1.38 for each barrel of crude that is purchased
by VRA.
v. For
the period February 2002, to February 2003, the Authority procured 4.804
million barrels of crude oil. The net
savings from this new arrangement was therefore US$6.65 million. With thermal
generation contributing almost 70% to this year’s power supply needs, the net
savings of the new arrangement will be expected to be much larger than what has
already been achieved so far.
vi. The
inadequate levels of tariff resulted in a severe cash flow crunch for the
Authority for the past several years. US$
58.2 million of short to medium term loans have been arranged with both local
and foreign banks to relieve the Authority’s cash squeeze and also to enable it
to facilitate the payment of its debts to its major creditors. The timely repayments of these loans has
engendered confidence in the banking and financial community who are willing to
provide even more facilities to the Authority to assist it to emerge out of its
difficult financial situation.
vii. Moreover,
the restoration of the Authority’s credibility as demonstrated by our ability
to service our debts, has removed the threat of power curtailment from our
suppliers.
vii. The
overall effect of the measures taken to improve the Authority’s financial health have led to substantial
improvement in operating cashflow and underlying
financial position of the Authority, even in the face of the growing cost of
thermal generation and the worsening impact of currency depreciation on our
finances.
2.3.3 PROVISION
OF LOGISTICS:
35. When
I joined VRA, the average age of the vehicular fleet was about 10 years old. The exception was the fleet of saloon cars
for some management staff which was between two to three years old. During my introductory interface with staff
at all the major locations in the Authority, the issue of the inadequacy and
unreliability of the Authority’s vehicles was brought home forcefully to
me. With concern about the handicap that
the vehicular problem was posing to the efficient running of the organisation,
I accelerated the programme of procurement of new vehicles for the Authority.
36. The
first phase of a three year programme entailed the procurement of 166 vehicles,
mainly cross country and double cabin pickups and 75 motor bicycles for the
operations of the Authority. Vehicles
were also procured for management staff covering Directors and Senior Managers
who needed vehicles to carry out essential operations. See
Appendix III. So mindful was I of
the Authority’s distressed financial situation, that we negotiated substantial
discounts on prices of the vehicles that we procured. In an effort to lead by example, I directed
that expenditure on the Chief Executive’s saloon car should be substantially
less than the sum spent on my predecessors.
37. It
is therefore a matter of surprise that so much fuss has been made by the Chief
Executive’s Volvo saloon car, which cost US$38,000, when the official vehicle,
a BMW top range saloon, for my immediate
predecessor cost the Authority US$ 95,000.
The extent of public interest in VRA’s
acquisition of vehicles was orchestrated by a section of the staff of the
Authority. One therefore is entitled to
beg the question as to why no similar fuss was made when my predecessor’s car
cost at least 21/2 times more than mine and was purchased
four years earlier than mine.
38. In
response to similar complaints of the inadequacy and obsolescence of computers
in the Authority, I arranged through competitive tendering processes for the
procurement of 250 computers and 57 printers to help improve the Authority’s
work. Vital communication equipment have also been secured for staff of the Transmission Systems
Department to help to improve communication between staff around the very wide
network of our operations. It is now the
standard practice in the Authority for every shift team in the key areas of
operations to have access to real time communication system.
39. A
programme of work has commenced to upgrade and renew all the major softwares that underpin the Authority’s business. The Human Resource Management System (HRMS) which
has been bedevilled with problems for the past five to six years is being
revamped and upgraded to the latest version.
In a departure from previous approach which affected the effective use
of the software, all the critical users of the software are being given direct
training to enable them to begin to use the software immediately.
40. The
billing system for customers in the Northern Electricity Department (NED) which
had become completely obsolete to the extent that it cannot generate bills more
quickly than two to three months behind schedule, has now been completely
replaced by a new PC-based billing software developed
by local Ghanaian expertise.
41. Arrangements
are also far advanced to upgrade the Materials and Financial Management softwares to enable the Authority to have timely and up to
date information for the effective management and control of our operations.
42. In
a special effort to address the growing financial problems of the NED,
especially significant losses in the power distribution area, measures have
been put in place to improve the billing and collection of tariffs for power
consumed in the NED area of operations.
50,000 pieces of load limiters, a device that enables consumers to be
supplied and billed for power consumption on a flat rate basis, have been
procured and are being deployed for use by life-line customers. Additionally, 50,000 pre-paid meters have
been ordered to enable a more effective billing of regular customers in the NED
area of operation. The introduction of
the pre-paid meters should improve the net cashflow
and operating efficiency by eliminating completely the possibility of consumers
using and not paying for electricity consumed.
43. In
an effort to ensure that consumers can be supplied with power after the barest
minimum interval following their application, and in an effort to support the
development of local industrial capacity, the Authority has contracted a local
manufacturer, selected through competitive bidding to manufacture branded
cables for use by NED.
2.4.4 STAFF
WELFARE:
44. The
following are some of the significant issues that have been addressed in an
effort to improve staff welfare and morale to enable them to work more
efficiently and productively:
i. Staff Promotions & Increments – which
had been left outstanding since 1996 were addressed within the first year of my
assumption of office. In all more than
800 individual cases were reviewed and action taken on them. In addition, a systematic mechanism has been
put in place that ensures that issues of promotion and increment are tackled
across the Authority at least every year.
ii. Outstanding Vacation Leave – which had
accumulated between five to seven years were resolved through mutual
agreement. Half of all outstanding leave
was commuted to cash payments whilst the other half was forfeited by
staff. This exercise was necessary in
the face of the reality that the staff could simply not take the outstanding
leave without significant adverse impacts on the operations. By the same token, any attempt to cancel the
leave without compensation would have met with stiff resistance. It could have taken at least 10 years to
reschedule the accumulated leave and would almost certainly have impacted
negatively on productivity at a time of major transition.
This exercise cost the Authority about ¢4 billion but
was hugely welcomed by the staff. Of
course, after this a very short regime has been put in place in which every
member of staff has been encouraged to take it or forfeit it, except at the
approval of the supervising authority.
iii. Staff Improvement Training Initiative
(SITI) – This is a programme established in conjunction with Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)
to offer opportunities for hard working staff at the technician level to obtain
degrees at KNUST and thereby to obtain higher levels of authority and
recognition in the VRA. The first batch
of prospective students are currently undergoing an inception programme and the
most successful will enter KNUST this October to commence their degree
qualification.
iv. Contract & Casual Workers - a clear
breach of established labour laws and natural justice, VRA has been engaging a
substantial number of casual workers for many years. All of these workers, some of whom have
worked for as many as 15 – 20 years received no entitlements such as provident
fund from the Authority. I Instructed
that as many as the Authority’s establishment could accommodate of the casual
workers who had worked for more than three years, should be made permanent and
given the full benefits and entitlements of the normal Authority staff.
v. Educational Grant & Loan - In order
to assist staff to meet the difficult challenge of payment of school fees for
their children, an Educational Grant of ¢1 million for one year has been
introduced and paid to all staff. In addition, an Educational Loan of ¢3 million
per year has been introduced with an interest rate of 2.5% to provide further
assistance to staff to pay their wards fees.
The interest rate of 2.5% is of course lower than the 6% interest rate
that students of tertiary institutions have to pay for the loans that they
receive from SSNIT.
vi. Provision of Telephone Facilities - In
an effort to improve the social life in all major areas of operations in VRA,
telephones are being installed in all residential houses of staff who live in
the Authority’s own houses. The service
provides free internal calls within the VRA internal communication system as
well as a user-pay access to
vii. Construction of JSS Complex at Akuse - After 18 years of waiting, a full JSS Complex
has been constructed at the Kpong Generating station
at Akuse. With
this the unfortunate and unacceptable spectacle of young people having to wake
up at around
viii. Housing & Transportation Allowances
- All staff who are not housed by the Authority now have automatic access to a
loan to help them to pay for their rent as well as assistance from the
Authority to deal with tenancy issues.
In an effort to ensure greater equity in the treatment of staff between
those who live in VRA’s enclaves and those who work
in other locations, housing and transportation allowances have been introduced
for all grades of staff irrespective of grade or location or work.
ix. Welfare Bus - A staff welfare bus has
been acquired for the Upper West area of our operations to bring them into line
with such facilities which have been enjoyed by other areas for many years.
45. The
Authority has taken over responsibility and cost of inspection of on-going
buildings being financed for staff through the Staff Provident Fund. It is also assisting staff to acquire the
necessary documentation on their properties by issuing letters to the Lands
Commission and other governmental bodies to support the applications of staff
2.5.5 PRODUCTIVITY
AND CONTROL
46. Anybody
reading the fore-going would wonder why VRA staff would want to see the back of
the Chief Executive when indeed they should be patting me on my back. The answer would probably lie in the
following chronology of measures that have been put into place to improve the
productivity of work in the Authority and to tighten operational control and
efficiency.
47. Working Hours – When I assumed office,
VRA staff had work hours from between
48. This
was then followed over by several hours of nearly automatic overtime. One of the first measures that I took to
improve productivity in the Authority therefore was to insist that the full 40
hours week that staff had signed into must be worked. This arrangement was introduced from
49. Provident Fund – the Provident Fund
(PF) was established by the Authority to help staff prepare for their
retirement. Specific uses for which the
Fund could be put, especially the construction of retirement homes and purchase
of land for economic activities were laid out in the Rules and Articles of
Association of the Fund. Within three
months of taking office, I found that the Rules for the disbursement of the PF
had been set aside and the requisite documentation needed to corroborate that
the funds were being used for the expressed purpose for which it was set up were
not being provided in virtually all cases.
50. I
found this to be clearly an abuse of public funds and took steps to insist that
the Rules that govern the Fund must be vigorously observed. Upon representations by the staff groups for
a review of the Rules, a Committee made up entirely of staff members was established
to review the operations of the Staff PF and to bring recommendations for
consideration and approval by the Board.
The Committee’s major finding was that essentially the Provident Fund
should be maintained as originally intended, with certain modifications in its
operational management to improve the processing and documentation for staff
application.
51. To
demonstrate my commitment to the full functioning of the PF for its expressed
purposes, I established a distinct section called the Provident Fund Pension Section
(PFPS), to ensure the effective support to staff to enable them to access and
use the funds for their retirement plans.
I have also put arrangements in place to appoint staff welfare officers
in all the major areas of operation to enable them process applications.
52. Excessive Overtime – the problem of
excessive claim for overtime has dogged the Authority for many years. Indeed, documentation was shown to me
detailing the various attempts by previous management to bring the claims for
overtime under some manageable control.
For reason that I was not able to fathom, but should now probably
understand based on current events the recommendations for the various
investigations into excessive overtime claims were never implemented by
previous administrations. Given the very
dire financial state of the Authority, I deemed it very urgent and necessary
that every effort should be made to eliminate unjustified and unworked overtime.
53. The
purpose of the exercise and the reversion to normal 40-hour week was not to
abolish overtime, but to ensure that the overtime claimed was actually worked
and therefore, deemed as essential. Also
in line with the explicit statements in Collective Bargaining Agreement and
Senior Staff Conditions of Service, measures are being taken to ensure that staff do not work inordinately long hours of overtime, so that
their health would not suffer. It is
interesting to note that one of the biggest health problems faced by staff of
the Authority is hypertension and related disorders arising perhaps from not
having enough time to rest.
54. Abuse of Vehicles and Mismanagement of
Fuel – A measure has been introduced
whereby all operational vehicles that belong to the Authority must be parked in
designated places at the close of each working day. Failure to do so results in the sanctioning of
the affected drivers. This measure has
enabled the Authority to institute an effective control on the excessive use of
fuel as well as reduce the spate of accidents which seem to afflict the
vehicles belonging to the Authority that were used outside of the normal
working hours. This was formerly not the
case.
55. Abuse of Telephones - Controls have been put into place to check the abuse in the use of
telephones within the Authority. A
careful monitoring of the VRA telephone system reveals that as many as 20
members of staff had International Direct Dialling access in their resident
homes without the expressed authority or permission of management of the
Authority. Management staff
of the Authority were provided with the use of telephones in their
offices, homes and mobile phones without any explicit limits on the cost of the
use.
56. Also
many of the staff had automatic dial out access to Ghana Telecom through VRA’s communication system.
Measures have been taken to eliminate all this waste and measures have
been put in place for the proper control of this facility. Limits have been set for all management staff
for all the phones they use, and dial out access in VRA’s
communication system is now limited to specific users.
57. To Introduce Greater Transparency In Procurement
– To ensure greater transparency and equity in the procurement of goods and
services for the Authority, a re registration exercise was undertaken to open
up the Authority’s suppliers list to all interested vendors, especially those
who had hitherto been blacklisted and or prevented from registering with the
Authority. A classic example was where
staff sought to disqualify an insurance company whose quotation had been
adjudged the best ‘because the company was not known to VRA’.
58. In
addition, a monthly procurement magazine, titled ‘Volta Buy’ has been
introduced in which is advertised all the major procurements being undertaken
by the Authority. The magazine is
available free to all registered suppliers at all the major operating
centres. There has been some resistance
among staff to the operation of the Volta Buy, since it has now removed the
cloak of secrecy which surrounded some of the procurement practices.
59. Audits - As part of the efforts to
improve the operation and efficiency of the Authority’s work, the number of specific
checks through internal audits carried into the work of various sections have
been stepped up. Since I assumed office
a total of 75 such audits have been carried out and these have revealed very
substantial slippages in the application of proper procedures, and the loss of
several billions of cedis to the Authority. Rigorous enforcement of the findings and
recommendations from these have clearly made some
peoples lives uncomfortable. There can however,
be no other way forward for an Authority that is so cash strapped.
60. Financial Discipline – The tightening
up of lapses in financial discipline such as to eliminate: spurious claims for
allowances, the abuse of travel and trekking per diem allowances, the failure
to account for imprest for local and foreign travel,
the failure to retire imprest taken out for specific
operations on a timely basis has contributed to a substantial reduction and in
some cases total elimination of waste of the Authority’s resources.
61. Measuring Productivity – In the absence
of a systematic mechanism for assessing the productivity and contribution of
staff and departments to the work of the Authority, annual bonuses have
hitherto been paid across the board to all members of staff. The payment of bonus had become a 13th
month salary, since it was not related to any real measurement of the Authority’s
performance for the year. Measures are
now being put in place to tie bonus payments to demonstrative measurable
indications of performance of individual members of staff, sections and
divisions within departments, the departments themselves, branches of the
Authority and ultimately the Authority itself.
The era of blanket bonuses is over and each and every staff member is
now being required to justify their job and the remuneration that they earn.
62. Enforcement of Disciplinary Procedure –
Measures have been taken to ensure that rules and
codes for the disciplined conduct of the Authority’s business are enforced in a
timely fashion. When I joined the
Authority, I discovered that a considerable number of drivers who had been
involved in accidents for periods of more than 2 years were still waiting to be
dealt with in accordance with the disciplinary codes of the Authority. There were also substantial lapses in other
areas, in the implementation of the disciplinary code. This included the failure to complete the
prosecution of an officer who had mis-appropriated up
to ¢550 million of the Provident Fund (PF) of staff of the Authority. The conduct of investigations into
disciplinary lapses still followed the laid down procedures but is now done in
a more accelerated fashion.
63. It
is clear from the fore-going that, I am enforcing and insisting on a higher
standard of performance and conduct from all VRA staff. Clearly the net effect of all of this is
perhaps seen by staff as a systematic slaughter of their sacred cows of many
years of fattened breeding. Clearly this
is almost tantamount to me causing a sacrilege and has certainly blinded them
to the more positive benefits that my stewardship has brought to them and the
Authority.
2.6.6 MANAGEMENT STYLE:
64. If
there is one area of my stewardship at VRA which has come under most discussion,
it is the perception that my management style is autocratic and
unacceptable. Of course, I did carry a
general label of ‘Arrogant’ with me into VRA and that folkloric perception
seems to be put out by many people who do not even come into contact with
me. I do admit that my work ethic and
norms may be fundamentally at odds with the general perspectives of many in society. But I also do believe that straight talk is
an important tool in modern management practice as long as there is no abuse or
offence caused to colleagues. It is my
firm conviction that the reality of the measures that I have
put into the VRA do not support the charge of autocracy and arrogance
65. Devolution and Decentralisation (D&D)
– Within two months of taking up my appointment, I introduced the management
style of D & D into VRA’s operations. Under the D& D, departments are treated
as self-managed cost centres, with each Director acting as the Chief executive
Officer of their department, and their Deputy Chief Executives acting as the
supervising Board members for the Branch.
Levels of authority and responsibility which were all embodied in the
office of the Chief Executive have been devolved to management, as have
activities which hitherto used to be carried out centrally have now been
decentralised to the major operating areas.
Each Branch Head has also been given the direct managerial and
supervisory control of all the management and staff under the various
departments under their Branch.
66. The
Chief Executive chairs monthly meetings at which reports from the Branch heads
are received, discussed and decisions taken on a collective basis. Executive Directors have been equipped with
their own departmental financial imprest and given
their own departmental cheque books to enable them meet immediate and urgent
operational needs of their departments without having to sit and wait for long
periods while the centre deals with their needs and delivers them as soon as
possible.
67. Contact with Staff – I have introduced
a system of twice yearly durbars for all staff in all major operational areas
of the Authority. Prior to this, visits
by the Chief Executive to operational areas were few and far in-between, and
staff durbars were clearly not a regular feature of the management functions of
the Authority.
68. In
addition to the twice yearly durbars, I have instituted a programme of
one-on-one engagement with staff to address their own peculiar welfare and
personal issues. To date, I have met
more than 200 members of staff on individual basis and all the issues raised by
them have subsequently been addressed even though not all have been solved.
69. Forcing the Pace – Deadlines: The norm in VRA in response to timeliness of deliveries
has always been to promise to deliver ‘as soon as possible’. Clearly, in the changed circumstances whereby
we need to find resources for our operations on a more frequent and regular
basis, the laxity inherent in the ‘as soon as possible’ mentality cannot be
allowed to continue. I have therefore
insisted on instituting and demanding the adherence to deadlines for all major
activities carried out for the Authority.
I do admit that I do not take kindly to slippages in schedules and make
my displeasure known in very strong and forceful terms.
70. Perhaps
the way I come across may be sometimes intimidating for those who are not
prepared to work for which one must naturally profess an apology, but I do not
believe those who I worked closely with are offended by the style.
2.7 SO
WHAT NEXT?
71. I
accepted the call by His Excellency, the President, Mr.
J. A. Kufuor to put my professional expertise to use
at the VRA. Even though I have dabbled
in politics, I considered the challenge as an opportunity to put my expertise
and experience to the service of my nation.
72. Unfortunately
and despite my expressly stated declaration that, I have gone on political
holiday, it has been difficult for people to separate my work of the last two
years from the every day politics of the country. This is rather unfortunate as judgement of
the merits or otherwise of my tenure as Chief Executive of VRA has more often
than not been seen from a political rather than a technical perspective.
73. What
I have done in this testament, is to put the basic facts of the issues, the
challenges, the actions and the impact of my work over the past 22 months
down. I have done so to put the facts
before the people of
74. When
I joined the VRA 22 months ago, I made it very clear that I was not in for the
long haul. I saw my tenure as short,
eventful and lasting for five years at the most. Clearly, I do not believe that the challenge
given me has been completely fulfilled.
However, I took a decision 15 years ago to return to
75. What
happens next is quite properly the prerogative of His Excellency, the
President, J. A. Kufuor.